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I.  INTRODUCTION 
College football in the South is said to be tantamount to religion.1  Its 
popularity in the region is unmatched by any professional sports teams, and 
many southerners are born and raised into families of college fans dating back 
generations.2  Today, college football is very much a part of Southern culture 
and identity, with each team possessing its own unique traditions.  In the 
context of merchandise, these traditions make money.  As a result, universities 
will go to great lengths to protect them. 
One can hardly think of the University of Alabama’s football team without 
being reminded of its legendary coach Paul “Bear” Bryant.  When one hears 
“Bear” Bryant, the image of the coach pacing the sideline with his famous 
houndstooth fedora comes to mind.  Coach Bryant was not only a winning 
football coach; he was also a fashion trend-setter at the University of Alabama.  
Throughout the years of Coach Bryant’s coaching tenure and beyond, Alabama 
fans began regularly wearing houndstooth pattern clothing to football games.3  
Today, houndstooth is abundant at Alabama football games.  It is probably 
accurate to say that Southern football fans nowadays, especially fans of teams in 
the NCAA’s Southeastern Conference (SEC), would identify houndstooth 
patterns or designs as synonymous with the Alabama Crimson Tide.  For 
Alabama fans, houndstooth is considered the “third, and unofficial” team 
color.4  The university has therefore taken advantage of the pattern’s local 
popularity as it now sells an array of team merchandise and game day clothing 
with the houndstooth design.5  With the growing popularity of a pattern 
symbolizing the team and the university, there comes the need to protect it.  
The university has responded to this necessity by attempting to restrict the use 
of the pattern in other business’s logos, with mixed results.6  The most recent 
instance of attempting to restrict a company’s use of the pattern ignited a legal 
battle as heated as any contest the Bear ever coached on the football field.  
The University of Alabama’s lawsuit against Houndstooth Mafia is 
illustrative of a modern trend of universities initiating lawsuits against those 
accused of infringing their trademarked material.7  Unlike the unrivaled passion 
for college football and its colorful traditions, this trend is not exclusive to the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Andrew Hall, College Football: The Pride and Joy of the South, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles /1875948-college-football-the-pride-and-joy-of-the-south. 
 2 Id. 
 3 The History of Alabama and the Houndstooth Hat, CAPSTONE REPORT (Mar. 24, 2016), http:// 
capstonereport.com/2016/03/24/the-history-of-the-alabama-houndstooth-hat/30799/.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See John Jennings, University Trademark Licensing: Creating Value Through a “Win-Win” 
Agreement, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/doc 
uments/uni_trademark _licensing_fulltext.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
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South.  Universities across the country are increasingly turning to intellectual 
property (IP) law to protect their images while “generat[ing] income” from the 
dissemination of their unmistakeable “brand[s].”8  These goals are oftentimes 
achieved through licensing agreements with those wishing to sell merchandise 
with the university’s logos or marks; however, when unlicensed entities use the 
mark or create a mark which can be easily confused with the university’s mark, 
they may become liable for infringing on the university’s trademark, absent a 
fair use defense consistent with the presence of consumer confusion.9 
Universities execute trademark licensing agreements by granting licenses to 
certain producers or distributors to create merchandise with their marks.10  
Licensing agreements may be exclusive or nonexclusive and will normally spell 
out in detail to what extent the licensed agents are authorized to use the mark.11  
Perhaps most importantly, it is through trademark licensing agreements that the 
marks earn money for the universities—in the form of royalties.12  Standard 
royalty fees are generally in the range of 8% of sales, but universities will take 
advantage of their increasing fame to boost overall revenue from these 
royalties.13  Today’s universities, therefore, have a great interest in protecting 
their marks from infringers in order to maximize profits from their mark’s use.  
The interest that universities have in protecting their marks from 
infringement is demonstrated by the resources they devote to that protection.  
Universities today commonly have entire departments dedicated to the licensing 
and protection of their trademarks.14  It is also a general practice for universities 
to hire independent licensing firms, which not only assist in the licensing 
process but also may take a proactive role in fighting infringement or 
counterfeits.15  These resources are especially important for major universities 
with popular sports teams, which stand to lose significant revenue from 
unlicensed products.16 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.  See also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 
(2004).   
Since the burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with the plaintiff, and 
the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show confusion unlikely, 
it follows (contrary to the Court of Appeals’s view) that some possibility of 
consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is. 
 10 Jennings, supra note 7. 
 11 Ryan Gabay, Note, Sunbeam: A Ray of Hope for Trademark Licensees, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 
253 (2013).  
 12 Id. at 254. 
 13 See Jennings, supra note 7, for a discussion of how the University of Texas increased revenue 
from royalties following its football NCAA National Championship in 2005.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. for a discussion of the prevalence of counterfeiting at major college sporting events 
such as football and basketball championship games. 
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The University of Alabama undoubtedly has national fame given its recent 
streak of football national championships and certainly has an interest in 
protecting its marks to drive revenue and preserve its brand. Crimson Tide fans 
have responded to the increase in national fame and popularity by buying and 
proudly showing off their Alabama merchandise—to include any team marks or 
clothing in the locally popular houndstooth pattern.17  In addition to the fans, 
the university itself has responded to this increase in fame—and therefore 
revenue—by aggressively initiating legal action against unlicensed vendors using 
or creating certain marks related to its sports teams.18  Included in these 
“infringing” marks (as the university sees them) are marks incorporating the 
houndstooth pattern—even though the University of Alabama does not own a 
trademark over the pattern.19  
One such lawsuit has begun a legal fight which has put the relationship 
between the United States Patent and Trademark Office—specifically the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)—and the federal courts in 
jeopardy.  When the University of Alabama sued Houndstooth Mafia, it 
initiated a legal battle between administrative agencies and federal courts.20  The 
ensuing standoff has resulted in a federal court order21 which, on the surface, 
appears to be in direct conflict with a 2015 holding from the United States 
Supreme Court.22  Because the TTAB has explicitly stated that it is reserving the 
right to appeal, this standoff is not over.23 
This Note will examine the legal consequences of Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Houndstooth Mafia Enterprises, LLC, (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 
2016).  Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the relationship 
between federal agencies and federal courts—specifically, the relationship 
between the courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Part II 
will also examine the precedent set by the Supreme Court in B&B Hardware, Inc. 
v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).  Part II will conclude with a 
discussion of the facts behind Houndstooth Mafia and where the case stands 
today. 
                                                                                                                   
 17 See Jon Solomon, Who has a right to use houndstooth? University of Alabama fights, even without a 
trademark, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/11/university_of_alabama _fight 
s_u.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2013). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Houndstooth Mafia Enter., LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21645 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2016). 
 21 See Paolo A. Strino & Patricia A. Clark, Alabama District Court Orders TTAB to Vacate 
Precedential Decision, GIBBONS IP LAW ALERT (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.iplawalert.com/2016/04 
/articles/trademark/alabama-district-court-orders-ttab-to-vacate-precedential-decision/.  
 22 See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 23 TTAB Relents: Board Agrees to Vacate Likelihood of Confusion Finding at District Court’s Direction, 
PROSKAUER (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/ttab-relents-bo 
ard-agrees-to-vacate-likelihood-of-confusion-finding-at-district-courts-direction/.  
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Part III of this Note will analyze the legal repercussions of Houndstooth Mafia 
and the effects that the case will have on the relationship between agencies and 
the courts, especially on the relationship between the courts and the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board.  Furthermore, Part III will argue that the court order 
of Houndstooth Mafia represents a step in the wrong direction given the Supreme 
Court’s holding in B&B Hardware.  Part IV will conclude that the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board should appeal the federal court’s order on the grounds 
that the agency’s decisions have preclusive effect on the courts given the 
holding of B&B Hardware.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  TRADEMARKS 
“A trademark may be a word, logo, design, scent, sound, color, personal 
name, container, building or any number of other signifiers.”24  The Lanham 
Act of 1946 provides legal protection to marks by allowing their owners to file 
for registration with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).25  Mark 
owners may file for marks that they intend to use in commerce,26 but are not 
legally required to do so: mark ownership “flows from prior use,” but 
registration of a mark provides additional benefits to the owner.27  Trademark 
registration also benefits consumers by preventing confusion as to the source of 
the product in order to guarantee that the consumer knows what he or she is 
purchasing.28  
However, not every mark is eligible for protection by registration.  Marks 
must first and foremost be distinctive—that is, representative of and identifiable 
with the mark owner’s products or services.29  Marks that are only descriptive of 
                                                                                                                   
 24 1-2 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.01 (Matthew 
Bender & Co., 2017). 
 25 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1946).  
 26 Id. 
 27 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 16:17–
16:19, 19:9 (4th ed. 2016).   
“Trademark ownership is not acquired by federal or state registration.” 
Ownership rights “flow [only] from prior use”, either actual or 
constructive . . .  Similarly, incorporation under a corporate name does not, in 
the absence of use, confer the right to prevent others from using a similar name.  
Neither does a state registered mark give rights superior to a prior user of the 
mark.  Federal registration does convey important rights, however, such as the 
priority of constructive use, and a presumption of validity, which may ripen into 
“incontestable” status. 
 28 See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 1.03.  
 29 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946). 
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the mark owner’s goods or services will be denied registration by the USPTO, 
unless the mark acquires a secondary meaning.30  
In making that determination, distinctiveness is scaled by various levels of 
protection eligibility.31  Marks that are “merely descriptive” are generally 
unprotectable, while some marks can lose protection by becoming “generic” by 
overuse in common language (for example, “Xerox” or “Kleenex”).32  More 
creative marks, so called “arbitrary” or “fanciful” marks, are the strongest and 
therefore most eligible for legal protection.33  
Even if a mark is distinct, it may still be denied by the USPTO on other 
grounds.  The Lanham Act prevents registration of marks that consist of 
national insignia, marks representative of living people without their consent, 
and marks which closely resemble marks already registered with the USPTO.34  
A licensing agreement represents a preventative measure used to protect 
trademarks from infringement.  The Lanham Act grants remedies to those 
whose marks have been infringed, so long as the mark’s owner has given notice 
of the registration wherever the mark is displayed (generally seen as ®).35  
Under the act, owners of marks may sue for infringement if the alleged 
infringers have reproduced the mark or a mark so similar that would cause 
confusion as to its source, and use or intend to use the reproduced mark in 
commerce or sales—all without permission of the mark’s actual owner.36  
Rightful owners of marks are entitled to injunctive relief against an infringer’s 
continued reproduction of the mark, and in cases of intentional infringement, 
monetary damages.37  
Registration eligibility for protection of “non-word” marks is generally more 
difficult to assess in accordance with the “distinctiveness spectrum.”38  
Although non-word marks may not fit neatly into the spectrum, courts have 
consistently given protection to such marks that have “acquired secondary 
meaning.”39  The mark must be distinct when the infringement cause of action 
is filed; however, marks that are not initially distinct may acquire distinctiveness 
given their identity and use over time.40  
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. 
 31 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946).  See also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (finding 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a)’s prohibition of disparaging marks unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 1111. 
 36 Id. § 1114. 
 37 Id. 
 38 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24. 
 39 Id.  See also Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 546–47 (5th Cir. 
2015) (holding a visual mark ineligible for protection due to being “merely descriptive” and failure 
to acquire secondary meaning). 
 40 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24. 
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Trademark dilution is similar to infringement, but differs in that it does not 
necessarily involve confusion as to the source of the mark.41  The mark may be 
diluted by blurring, which is “association arising from the similarity between a 
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.”42  The key to winning a dilution by blurring claim is that the 
plaintiff’s mark be “famous.”43  
How is a mark’s fame measured?  Courts have applied various lines of 
reasoning to try to answer this question.  First, it is necessary to look at the 
statute: “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming 
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services 
of the mark's owner.”44  The reference to the “general consuming public” 
indicates that a mark must be famous enough to be a household name and 
easily recognizable among the whole population, rather than among, for 
example, college football fans.45  Therefore, a mark’s fame must be general, and 
not solely within a niche market.46  Consequently, the University of Alabama 
would likely not be successful in litigating dilution claims over its Crimson Tide 
team marks. 
B.  CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
Citizens’ rights to legally protect their intellectual property are rooted in our 
Constitution.47  The United States Constitution assigns the legislature the power 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”48  The “exclusive Right” alludes to protection via patent, 
copyright, or trademark and is intended to induce creativity and inventions 
which may benefit society.  
                                                                                                                   
 41 Id. 
 42 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (1946). 
 43 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 40. 
 44 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 45 See Bd. of Regents v. KST Electric, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678–79 (W.D. Tex. 2008) 
(denying anti-dilution protection to marks only famous in a niche market, in this case, college 
football).  
 46 See Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).   
A threshold question in a federal dilution claim is whether the mark at issue is 
“famous.”  Under the TDRA [Trademark Dilution Revision Act], a mark is 
famous if it “is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United 
States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).  By using the “general consuming public” as the 
benchmark, the TDRA eliminated the possibility of “niche fame,” which some 
courts had recognized under the previous version of the statute. 
 47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 48 Id. 
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From the time the Constitution was ratified and throughout the nineteenth 
century, Congress delegated a varying scope of power over patent review and 
approval to the executive branch, eventually leading to the creation of the 
United States Patent Office in 1836.49  A few years after Congress passed the 
Lanham Act, it created the modern United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) and gave it authority to review patent applications and grant or deny 
them according to its independent judgment.50  
Although the USPTO became the official authority for granting or denying 
patents, it has little power to act beyond that limited scope because the 
legislature did not delegate any rulemaking power to the agency.51  This limited 
scope likewise applies to the Office’s authority over trademarks, given the same 
statutory language referencing both the patent and trademark sides of the 
Office.52  Furthermore, without any requirement that “deference” be given to 
its decisions by the federal courts, the agency has virtually no power to enforce 
its decisions, and unsatisfied applicants will look to the courts to rectify any 
problems as need be.53 
C.  THE USPTO’S LIMITED AUTHORITY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND 
THE DOMINANCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Many arguments have been made in favor of expanding the USPTO’s 
rulemaking authority so that it no longer functions as a “weak administrative 
agency” with little to no influence over substantive issues of law.54  The USPTO 
alone “lacks authority to issue presumptively binding rules on the substantive 
legal questions”—that authority is allocated to the federal courts.55  The agency 
merely possesses the power of granting or denying patent applications without 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Samiyyah R. Ali, Note, The Great Balancing Act: The Effect of the America Invents Act on the 
Division of Power Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, 69 VAND. L. REV. 217, 
222 (2016). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32 
n.8 (2011).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (“The Director shall make rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under 
this Act.”). 
 53 Ali, supra note 49, at 222–23. 
 54 Id. at 223.  See also John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1041 (2011). 
 55 Golden, supra note 54 (“No matter how incoherent or tortured relevant judicial precedent is, 
the USPTO must try to distill it into a set of comprehensible guidelines for several thousand 
patent examiners, each of whom must ultimately rule on the patentability of claims in a sample of 
the hundreds of thousands of applications that the USPTO receives annually.”). 
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being able to determine “legal questions such as patentability.”56  These legal 
questions are for the Federal Circuit to hear on appeal.57  
Because of the USPTO’s lack of substantive rulemaking authority, Congress 
created the Federal Circuit as a court of subject matter expertise to hear cases 
on appeal from the USPTO’s decisions.58  Specifically, the Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of “the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to a 
patent application, derivation proceeding, reexamination, post-grant review, or 
inter partes review . . . .”59  Congress intended for the authority over intellectual 
property law, such as patentability, to be shared among the branches—the 
USPTO of the executive branch and the Federal Circuit of the judicial branch.60  
Although the USPTO “has an established record of developing nonbinding but 
influential interpretive rules on matters of substance,”61 federal courts (and the 
Federal Circuit in particular) are not required to grant deference to any of the 
USPTO’s decisions based on its interpretations of the law.62  It is argued that 
this lack of judicial deference given to the USPTO’s rulings has bolstered the 
Federal Circuit’s power as the only viable authority when it comes to 
patentability.63  
Despite the Federal Circuit’s overarching dominance in the realm of 
intellectual property law, the USPTO has begun a trend of fighting back against 
the court’s continuing lack of deference instead of simply allowing it to rule 
adversely to its decisions on appeal.64  Legal scholars have developed various 
arguments backing the USPTO’s quest for more power and control in the 
patent process.  One such argument for allowing the USPTO greater authority 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Id. at 1046. 
 57 Ali, supra note 49, at 224 (“The Federal Courts Improvement Act (‘FCIA’) provided the 
desired uniformity: the creation of the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over three 
sources of appeals: (1) federal district court cases ‘arising under’ the patent laws, (2) proceedings 
within the PTO, and (3) International Trade Commission (‘ITC’) investigations over potentially 
infringing imported products.”). 
 58 Id. 
 59 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (1982). 
 60 Ali, supra note 49, at 242. 
 61 Golden, supra note 54, at 1044. 
 62 Ali, supra note 49, at 229. 
 63 Id. at 229–30 (“Many scholars have suggested that the failure of Congress to give the PTO 
substantive interpretative powers of the Patent Act has rendered it a weak administrative agency. 
Others have blamed the Federal Circuit for creating for itself the role as the dominant, and maybe 
sole, player in patent policy.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has contributed to the balance of power 
in the patent system by continuously denying deference.”). 
 64 See id. at 230–32, for case examples of how the Federal Circuit continuously denies 
deference to the USPTO’s holdings and treats its limited administrative authority to interpret 
substantive legal questions despite the USPTO’s attempts to assert greater control and authority 
in the field of patent law.  See also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 
1991); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 
(1999). 
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to be able to interpret law concerning issues of patentability is that the federal 
courts have traditionally performed poorly at this task.65  The USPTO possesses 
and maintains subject matter expertise in the field of intellectual property law, 
whereas the federal courts struggle with developing various “tests” to apply on 
a case-by-case basis, often resulting in conflicting holdings or splits among the 
federal courts of appeals.66  The federal courts’ lack of expertise suggests that 
judges are ill-suited to declare holdings on specific issues of intellectual property 
subject matter, and certainly lack the competence “of their administrative 
agency counterparts.”67  
With the USPTO lacking interpretive authority over substantive legal 
questions, and consequently, federal courts holding that authority, the process 
of obtaining judgment over issues of intellectual property subject matter 
becomes quite “lengthy.”68  Because of the USPTO’s lack of real binding 
authority to interpret the law, patent or trademark applicants unhappy with the 
agency’s decisions may simply amend their applications while also appealing to 
the federal courts—creating a time-consuming process during which countless 
other patent or trademark applications “hang in the balance,” dependent on the 
court’s judgment.69  This lengthy process has been targeted with criticism by 
legal experts who see it as inefficient and perhaps detrimental. 
Because of the alleged incompetence of the courts to perform the necessary 
analysis to make judgments over cases concerning specific intellectual property 
subject matter, judges have been accused of declaring judgments simply based 
on their personal ideals in order to create policy.70  They do this by 
“camouflaging” their policy-making judgments behind multiple layers of legal 
analyses to make it seem like there is a reasonable approach to their 
conclusions, whereas in reality, the judges lack the required subject matter 
knowledge to make the necessary legal inquiries.71  
While arguments and proposals for expanding the USPTO’s interpretive and 
thus rule-making authority are currently trending, there exist a number of 
counter-arguments.  One such counter-argument is simple: that the USPTO, 
while maintaining expertise over the specific intellectual property subject 
matter, lacks the requisite experience “to handle substantive questions of 
statutory interpretation more competently than the courts.”72  The examiners of 
the agency may be experts in the field of patents and trademarks, and thus able 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Golden, supra note 54, at 1075. 
 66 Id. at 1074–75.  See Ali, supra note 49, at 223.  
 67 Golden, supra note 54, at 1084. 
 68 Id. at 1086–87. 
 69 Id. at 1086. 
 70 Id. at 1085. 
 71 Id. at 1085–86. 
 72 Id. at 1097. 
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to provide an extensive amount of legal advice from their unrivaled knowledge 
in that field, but they are not judges.73  
A second counter-argument is that, because the USPTO is an administrative 
agency and not a court, it is “overly subject to capture or bias.”74  Unlike a 
court, which is unbiased and beholden to rules of ethics, administrative agencies 
are prone to external influences which can potentially shape any rule-making 
authority they may possess.75  For example, the USPTO may be subject to 
industry capture, which is “the co-opting of regulatory agencies by [industry] 
groups.”76  Businesses with an interest in the USPTO’s decisions on patents or 
trademarks can seek to assert influence over the agency.77  Furthermore, being 
an administrative agency within the executive branch subjects the USPTO to 
political capture by politicians in the various branches seeking to use the agency 
as a tool to accomplish their own agendas.78  This political capture has been 
demonstrated by excessive lobbying for executive or legislative oversight of the 
agency for the benefit of the large and powerful patent-holding groups.79 
Despite the potential for capture or bias, many important administrative 
agencies exist that have substantial rule-making authority.80  Furthermore, 
where the USPTO has made decisions that limit eligibility for patentable subject 
matter, the federal courts have often acted to expand the spectrum of 
patentability (commonly by rejecting the USPTO’s decisions on appeal) under 
the oversight of “major business interests.”81  This history may actually provide 
evidence for the opposing view: that the courts, not the agency, are more prone 
to capture.82 
Besides the argument for expanding the rule-making authority of the 
USPTO, the other related argument is that courts should give significant 
deference to the USPTO’s interpretations of law.  Currently, the Federal Circuit 
maintains that courts are required to give “Chevron deference” to “procedural 
rules” created by the USPTO.83  This type of deference refers to a Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. at 1098. 
 74 Id.  
 75 See id.  See also Ali, supra note 49, at 242–43 (defining of “capture”). 
 76 Ali, supra note 49, at 243 (quoting Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. 
L. REV. 205, 241 (2015)) (alteration in original). 
 77 Ali, supra note 49, at 243. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Golden, supra note 54, at 1098. 
 80 See id. at 1099–1100 for a list of administrative agencies with broad rule-making power, 
despite the objection of the potential for capture.  See also Ali, supra note 49, at 244, for a further 
list of agencies having influence over the patent system. 
 81 Golden, supra note 54, at 1101–02. 
 82 Id. at 1102. 
 83 Id. at 1046–47 (“Further, Congress has explicitly granted the USPTO the power to make 
rules ‘govern[ing] the conduct of proceedings in the Office.’  The Federal Circuit has ruled that, 
with respect to rules promulgated under that authority, the USPTO receives Chevron deference, a 
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Court case from 1984 involving a different agency: the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).84  In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s statutory interpretation (of 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977) was “entitled to deference,” as long as 
the agency’s interpretation was based on a “permissible construction” in line 
with the intent of the law.85  The Court’s reasoning for requiring deference to 
agency holdings addresses some of the aforementioned concerns over judicial 
supremacy over agency decision-making:  
 Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either 
political branch of the Government.  Courts must, in some cases, 
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, an agency to 
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments.86 
Although Chevron represents an opportunistic power grab by the USPTO for 
the enforcement of its holdings, this type of deference has been limited by the 
courts.87  The USPTO only receives judicial deference on questions of law 
concerning practices and procedures internal to the agency.88  Significantly, the 
USPTO does not receive deference from the federal courts for “its legal 
interpretations of the Patent Act.”89  Ultimately, the only judicial deference 
afforded to the USPTO concerns its own procedural rules, but none for its legal 
interpretations of substantive law. 
D.  THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (TTAB) 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) is an administrative body 
within the USPTO which focuses exclusively on trademarks.  Once the USPTO 
determines the eligibility for a mark to be registered in the Official Gazette, any 
unsatisfied parties may petition the USPTO for administrative hearings before 
the TTAB.90  The TTAB only has jurisdiction to rule on “the right to register” a 
                                                                                                                   
high level of formal deference requiring courts to accept reasonable agency interpretations of 
statutory law.” (alteration in original)). 
 84 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 85 Id. at 865–66.  
 86 Id. at 865. 
 87 Ali, supra note 49, at 229. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Lian Osier, Issue Preclusion: The Effect B&B Hardware Will Have on Trademark Litigation, 15 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 257, 259 (2016).  
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mark—it has absolutely no authority to make holdings on infringement cases, 
cases concerning rights to use certain marks, and cases involving unfair 
competition.91  Because it is an administrative agency and not a court, the 
TTAB may not make any holdings on the constitutionality of statutes or any 
provisions of statutes (to include the Lanham Act).92  Having jurisdiction over 
rights to register marks, the TTAB hears proceedings between adverse parties 
(inter partes).93  The TTAB may hear four types of inter partes proceedings: (1) 
opposition proceeding, (2) cancellation proceeding, (3) interference, and (4) 
concurrent use proceeding.94 
In an opposition proceeding, the plaintiff petitions the board to oppose the 
issuing of a mark on the Principal Register, likely because he believes the mark 
will cause him to suffer damages.95  In a cancellation proceeding, the plaintiff 
petitions to have an already registered mark cancelled, for similar reasons.96  An 
interference is a proceeding in which the TTAB must determine the rightful 
owner of a mark and therefore award him the registration of the mark against 
others with conflicting applications.97  Finally, a concurrent use proceeding is 
one in which the TTAB must determine “whether one or more applicants is 
entitled to a concurrent registration on the Principal Register.”98  The TTAB 
will limit any concurrent registrations with certain geographic or time 
constraints or further constraints as to the mark’s use in commerce.99 
The TTAB may also hear “appeals of final refusals issued by USPTO 
Trademark Examining Attorneys within the course of the prosecution of 
trademark applications.”100  The TTAB’s operations are governed by the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP), which 
contains the board’s standard operating procedures but holds no binding legal 
authority.101  
After the TTAB has issued its judgment, parties wishing to appeal have two 
choices: appeal to the Federal Circuit or to a district court.102  When appealing 
to the Federal Circuit, the parties are not permitted to introduce any new 
evidence, unlike when appealing to a district court, in which new evidence as 
                                                                                                                   
 91 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 102.01. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, UNITEDSTATESPATENTANDTRADEMARKOFFICE.GOV, 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board-ttab 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
 94 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 102.02. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, supra note 93. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Osier, supra note 90, at 260. 
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well as certain new claims (for example, dilution or infringement) are 
permitted.103  Furthermore, “district courts have the authority to determine 
whether registration should be granted or whether registration should be 
cancelled.”104 
Falling under the USPTO, the TTAB is likewise an administrative agency 
under the same constraints: limited rule-making power, limited statutory 
interpretive authority, and limited judicial deference.105  However, as recently as 
2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a judgment directly related 
to these constraints of authoritative power on the TTAB.106  The Supreme 
Court in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015), 
changed the legal landscape of not only practices and procedures in intellectual 
property law, but also for the overall relationship between administrative 
agencies and the federal courts.107  
E.  PRECLUSIVE EFFECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: WHAT B&B 
HARDWARE MEANS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TTAB AND THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
The Supreme Court heard B&B Hardware after decades of practice by the 
Federal Circuit (and the federal courts in general) of denying any deference to 
USPTO decisions concerning substantive legal issues.108  Before B&B Hardware 
was decided, federal courts generally denied any deference to TTAB decisions 
concerning trademark infringement because TTAB jurisdiction is primarily over 
the right to register marks.109  The circuits, however, were split on the question 
of what preclusive effect the TTAB holdings over such legal issues would 
have—with the Third and Seventh Circuits giving TTAB decisions preclusive 
effect, the Second Circuit in certain cases, and the Fifth, Eleventh, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits flat out denying preclusion to TTAB decisions.110  B&B Hardware 
addressed this question and ruled that TTAB decisions over substantive issues, 
such as likelihood of confusion, would require preclusive effect from federal 
courts.111 
B&B Hardware began as an opposition proceeding before the TTAB.112  
B&B Hardware petitioned the TTAB to deny registration of Hargis’s mark 
“SEALTITE,” claiming that it would be likely confused with its own mark, 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, supra note 93. 
 106 See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 107 See generally id. 
 108 See Ali, supra note 49, at 225. 
 109 Osier, supra note 90, at 262. 
 110 Id. at 262–63. 
 111 Id. at 263–64. 
 112 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, at 1297. 
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/2
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2018  10:16 AM 
2017]   J. INTELL. PROP. L. 15 
“SEALTIGHT.”113  Both companies competed in similar markets: B&B 
Hardware produced its SEALTIGHT “for fasteners in the aerospace industry” 
and Hargis made its SEALTITE “for self-drilling screws for the construction 
industry.”114  The TTAB ruled in B&B Hardware’s favor, denying registration 
for Hargis’s “SEALTITE” on grounds of likelihood of confusion with B&B 
Hardware’s “SEALTIGHT.”115  
In addition to the opposition proceeding before the TTAB, both parties 
engaged in trademark infringement litigation before a federal district court, 
based on Hargis’s use of the mark.116  Likelihood of confusion is an element of 
both registration eligibility and trademark infringement, and during the 
opposition to registration proceedings before the TTAB, the agency held that 
there was a likelihood of confusion and thus Hargis’s mark was not eligible for 
registration.117  At the infringement litigation in federal court, B&B Hardware 
argued that the issue of likelihood of confusion was moot because the TTAB 
had already ruled that the likelihood existed, and therefore the court must give 
preclusive effect to that decision and not rule on it again.118  The federal district 
court declined to give deference to the TTAB’s decision on the likelihood of 
confusion because the TTAB is an administrative agency, not a court, and 
therefore its decisions are not entitled to issue preclusion.119  On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit likewise denied deference, but on the grounds that the TTAB 
used a different set of factors in its evaluation of the likelihood of confusion 
issue than the district court had.120  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
reconcile the circuit split and decide whether and to what extent federal courts 
must give issue preclusion to decisions of administrative agencies.121 
According to the Restatement Second of Judgments, “[w]hen an issue of 
fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and 
the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive 
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim.”122  The question before the Court was whether issue preclusion must 
apply to administrative agency decisions on issues at argument in a federal 
court.  As previously mentioned, the federal circuit courts were split over this 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. 
 114 Ralph H. Cathcart, B&B Hardware v. Hargis – What it Means and How it Will Affect TTAB 
Litigation, LADAS & PERRY EDUCATION CENTER 1 (Aug. 24, 2015), http://ladas.com/education-
center/bb-hardware-v-hargis-what-it-means-and-how-it-will-affect-ttab-litigation/. 
 115 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1297. 
 116 Id. at 1299. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 1302. 
 120 Id. at 1297. 
 121 Id. at 1302. 
 122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
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question.123  The Fifth Circuit, for example, took the approach that issue 
preclusion did not apply to TTAB decisions because the TTAB analyzes issues 
solely with respect to registration of marks, and not infringement—and 
therefore are different issues altogether.124  The Second Circuit, like the Eighth, 
zeroed in on the TTAB’s analysis of the issues before it—specifically, on the 
factors it uses in making its decisions.125  According to the Second Circuit, the 
TTAB uses a different analysis and applies a different set of factors when 
reaching its decisions than those the courts use, then its decisions are not 
binding on the courts.126  By granting certiorari to hear B&B Hardware, the 
Supreme Court sought to eliminate this split among the federal circuits and rule 
definitively on what judgments decided by administrative agencies are deserving 
of judicial deference. 
B&B Hardware’s argument was simple: that Hargis was “precluded from 
contesting [the issue of] the likelihood of confusion” of the marks because the 
TTAB had already ruled that the likelihood exists.127  The foundation of 
Hargis’s argument was that decisions from administrative agencies are not 
entitled to judicial deference, and in this case issue preclusion, because they are 
not Article III courts and thus their decisions are not binding on federal 
courts.128  Hargis pointed to a number of different lines of reasoning to support 
its stance.129 
Hargis first presented a constitutional argument: that in order for the 
Lanham Act to be interpreted in harmony with the United States Constitution, 
it must not allow Article III courts to award issue preclusion to decisions of 
administrative agencies.130  In rejecting Hargis’s constitutional concerns, the 
Supreme Court pointed to the precedent of giving preclusive effect to the 
TTAB’s decisions, explaining that “our precedent holds that the Seventh 
Amendment does not strip competent tribunals of the power to issue 
judgments with preclusive effect.”131  Hargis furthered its constitutional 
argument: that if federal courts allow issue preclusion to decisions of 
administrative agencies, they violate Article III.132  Again, the Court referenced 
                                                                                                                   
 123 See Osier, supra note 90, at 262–63. 
 124 Id. at 267.  See, e.g., Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9 (1974) 
(“A claim for service mark and trade name infringement and a claim for registration present 
different questions of law and fact, and the relief sought in one action is fundamentally different 
from the relief sought in the other. . . . While the same parties are fighting over the same word in 
the two suits, in substance, the causes of action are not the same.” (citations omitted)). 
 125 Osier, supra note 90, at 272. 
 126 Id. 
 127 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1297 (2015). 
 128 See id. at 1304. 
 129 See id. at 1304–09. 
 130 Id. at 1304.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States . . . .”). 
 131 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1304. 
 132 Id. 
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precedent in denying Hargis’s constitutional concerns and refused to give the 
Lanham Act such a narrow reading as would bring up questions of 
constitutionality.133 
Hargis next pointed to legislative intent, arguing that “Congress would not 
want TTAB decisions to receive preclusive effect, even in those cases in which 
the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.”134  Although Justice Alito 
did not go into great detail for the reasons behind Hargis’ legislative intent 
argument, he bluntly stated that “nothing in the Lanham Act bars the 
application of issue preclusion.”135  To support its argument, Hargis cited 
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991), which held 
that the petitioner was not precluded from re-litigating a matter under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) in the federal courts.136  
The Court distinguished Astoria by explaining that the petitioner there sought to 
relitigate the same matter in federal court, unlike in B&B Hardware where the 
registration claim was not reviewed by the TTAB and the infringement claim 
was reviewed in the federal district court distinctly.137  The Court reiterated the 
fact that the claim in the federal court was a separate claim than that before the 
TTAB, and, notably, that “registration is not a prerequisite to an infringement 
action.”138  To conclude its reasoning in rejecting Hargis’s argument of 
legislative intent to deny preclusion to TTAB decisions, the Court held: “[w]hen 
a district court, as part of its judgment, decides an issue that overlaps with part 
of the TTAB’s analysis, the TTAB gives preclusive effect to the court’s 
judgment.”139 
Hargis’s last argument was its weakest.  Hargis’s “streamlined process” 
argument maintained the position that, by giving preclusive effect to TTAB 
decisions for infringement litigation, the Court will essentially be holding up the 
efficiency of the TTAB’s registration process.140  This holding would incentivize 
parties in TTAB proceedings to devote “more time and energy” because of the 
lasting effects that its holdings would have in subsequent litigation—thereby 
destroying the “streamlined process” that Congress intended.141  The Court 
firmly rejected this argument, saying if Congress intended trademark registration 
to be a “streamlined process,” “it would not have authorized de novo challenges 
for those ‘dissatisfied’ with TTAB decisions.”142 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Id. at 1304–05. 
 134 Id. at 1305. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). 
 137 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1305. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 1305–06. 
 140 Id. at 1306. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)). 
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In its judgment for Hargis, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis 
employed by the Eighth Circuit—which focused on the factors used to 
determine if the likelihood of confusion element was met—and held that 
different factors examined by the TTAB and the federal courts “[do] not 
prevent issue preclusion.”143  The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for its factor test 
was that, because different factors were employed to examine the issue of 
likelihood of confusion, it was not the same issue at all—and therefore issue 
preclusion would not apply.144  In its rejection of the factors test, the Supreme 
Court stated “it does not matter that registration and infringement are governed 
by different statutory provisions.  Often a single standard is placed in different 
statutes; that does not foreclose issue preclusion.”145  The court held, 
importantly, “likelihood of confusion for purposes of registration is the same 
standard as likelihood of confusion for purposes of infringement.”146  
Therefore, despite different factors and different purposes for legal action 
(registration and infringement), the issue was the same and the TTAB’s holding 
on the issue of likelihood of confusion would preclude further examination of 
the matter.  The rule of B&B Hardware is "[i]f a mark owner uses its mark in 
ways that are materially the same as the usages included in its registration 
application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue 
as a district court.”147  
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware was 
to reconcile the split among the federal circuit courts in regards to preclusive 
effect on TTAB decisions.148  Furthermore, the decision enhanced the power 
and authority of the TTAB by making its own determinations on issues of 
trademark eligibility final and binding.149  Consequently, perhaps as foreseen by 
Hargis, the “stakes” became “much higher” in a TTAB action because the 
parties are now without the option to re-litigate certain issues in federal court 
once they have been determined by the board.150  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case will certainly affect the 
relationship between administrative agencies and federal courts, with the courts 
now required to give deference to agencies’ holdings on issues being 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Osier, supra note 90, at 265.  See id. at 270–72 for a discussion of the Second Circuit’s 
analysis of Levy v. Kosher Overseers Assoc. of America, 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997).  The Second Circuit 
employed the same “factors” analysis as the Eighth Circuit.  The immediate impact from B&B 
Hardware would not only reject the Eighth Circuit’s factor test, but also the Second’s. 
 144 B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1306.  
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. at 1307. 
 147 Id. at 1308.  
 148 See Osier, supra note 90, at 262–63 (discussing the circuit split at the time the B&B Hardware 
case was decided). 
 149 See Cathcart, supra note 114 (explaining greater importance of TTAB decision). 
 150 Id. 
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concurrently or subsequently litigated.  B&B Hardware was decided in 2015,151 
so the long-term effects of the Supreme Court’s holding have yet to be seen.  
However, in a recent case brought against a group of college football fans in 
Alabama, a federal district judge seems to have completely disregarded the B&B 
Hardware holding and instead sought to assert the federal court’s authority over 
the TTAB152—representing a step in the opposite direction from B&B 
Hardware.  
F.  HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA: B&B HARDWARE’S FIRST TEST  
The University of Alabama, like other major universities with successful and 
popular sports teams, has a major financial interest in protecting its marks.153  It 
does so by registering the marks with the USPTO and issuing licenses to 
vendors allowing them to sell merchandise featuring the marks in exchange for 
royalties.154  Following the recent trend in increasing trademark infringement 
litigation by universities, Alabama too has become increasingly aggressive in 
opposing potentially infringing marks in recent years.155  Among the 
University’s most recognizable marks is the houndstooth pattern, made famous 
by its iconic coach, Paul “Bear” Bryant.156  
Because of the pattern’s popularity among the fan base, the University has 
sought to oppose any registration of marks using the pattern on grounds that 
marks would be confused with the University of Alabama.157  As stated by the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, “[t]he University 
has licensed the Houndstooth pattern as a trademark in connection with various 
goods because it contends the pattern is well-known to be associated with the 
University.”158  
As noted by the federal court, the University of Alabama is a “repeat 
player[ ] before the TTAB.”159  In the past decade, the University has opposed 
the registration of the marks of GameDawg, LLC and The Tuscs, LLC because 
of their use of the houndstooth pattern, claiming that the pattern “has long 
been associated with the University and its former football coach, Paul 
                                                                                                                   
 151 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 152 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 
1150, 1157–58 (2016). 
 153 See generally Jennings, supra note 7. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See Solomon, supra note 17. 
 156 See The History of Alabama and the Houndstooth Hat, supra note 3, for a discussion of how Bear 
Bryant made the houndstooth pattern synonymous with the University of Alabama and how its 
popularity among Alabama fans has resulted in their adoption of the pattern as the “third, and 
unofficial” team color. 
 157 See Solomon, supra note 17. 
 158 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 110, 
1154 (2016). 
 159 Id. 
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Bryant.”160  The most recent case of houndstooth use comes in the wake of 
B&B Hardware, and has initiated yet another standoff between the TTAB and 
the federal courts. 
Houndstooth Mafia began as a group of Alabama fans who tailgated 
together at Crimson Tide football games.161  This group of friends called 
themselves the “Houndstooth Mafia,” and decided to form a limited liability 
corporation (LLC) to develop merchandise featuring the houndstooth 
pattern.162  The group sought to register their mark with the USPTO in 2007, 
only to have the University of Alabama (along with Paul Bryant, Jr., son of the 
legendary coach) oppose the registration before the TTAB.163  The University 
opposed the registration on the grounds that the houndstooth patterned design 
would cause confusion as to the source of the mark and could cause people to 
unknowingly associate the University or the coach with the “mafia”—organized 
crime.164  
The TTAB found in favor of Houndstooth Mafia, and held “that the 
opposition lacked a showing of distinctiveness in the pattern, likelihood of 
confusion with the University’s marks, or that the Houndstooth Mafia’s use of 
the word ‘mafia’ is disparaging.”165  Following the TTAB’s holding for the 
defendants, the University exercised its right to “challeng[e] the board’s ruling” 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) and filed suit in the federal district court for 
the Northern District of Alabama.166  The University brought suit alleging 
trademark infringement and unfair competition.167  During the course of this 
subsequent litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement.168  
Under the settlement agreement, Houndstooth Mafia would basically hand 
over the mark’s rights to the University, but the University would agree to the 
settlement if, and only if, the TTAB’s decision was vacated.169  Both parties 
agreed to the terms, and Judge R. David Proctor of the Northern District of 
Alabama signed the consent judgment, ordering the TTAB to vacate its holding 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Solomon, supra note 17. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Id. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Id.  
 165 Will Gibbons, The University of Alabama Throws a Penalty Flag on the Use of Houndstooth Logo, 
FINDING IP VALUE (Apr. 29, 2016), https://findingipvalue.com/2016/04/29/the-university-of-
alabama-throws-a-penalty-flag-on-the-use-of-houndstooth-logo/.  
 166 Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.  The University decided to file a 
civil action in federal district court as opposed to appealing to the Federal Circuit in accordance 
with 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1).  
 167 Gibbons, supra note 165.  
 168 Id. 
 169 Houndstooth Mafia Enter., 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.  The University wanted the TTAB’s 
decision regarding the lack of likelihood of confusion in this case vacated because, as the court 
acknowledged, they are “repeat players before the TTAB” and were therefore “concerned with 
the precedential effect of the TTAB’s 2013 decision.” 
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of no likelihood of confusion concerning the houndstooth pattern mark.170  
The TTAB, however, did not vacate its holding—and in June 2015 (three 
months after the decision in B&B Hardware), decided on its own that it would 
not go along with the consent judgment, prompting the University to seek 
enforcement of the court’s order.171  The TTAB’s refusal thus reignited the 
conflict between it and the federal courts, which seemed to have been at least 
temporarily resolved by B&B Hardware.  Perhaps bolstered by the decision in 
that case to give its holdings preclusive effect (which in turn gives significantly 
more weight to its decisions), the USPTO refused to simply fold like a cheap 
suit and instead challenged the court on the grounds that “the parties did not 
have the right to agree among themselves that the Board’s precedential decision 
should be vacated.”172  This challenge by the USPTO, on behalf of the TTAB, 
represents the first of such by an administrative agency against a federal court in 
the post-B&B Hardware legal landscape. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  WHAT HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA MEANS FOR THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POST-B&B 
HARDWARE ERA 
The immediate outcome of Judge Proctor’s holding in the trademark 
infringement action in the federal court of the Northern District of Alabama 
was that the parties settled, and the University retained the rights to the 
houndstooth pattern used in Houndstooth Mafia’s mark.173  The USPTO, on 
behalf of the TTAB, however, fought the court’s order to vacate the TTAB’s 
holding on the likelihood of confusion element in the previous action before 
the court.174  
In opposing the University’s motion to enforce the consent judgment, and 
thus force the TTAB to vacate its judgment, the USPTO asserted that a federal 
court is without authority to order vacatur of a decision by the TTAB in order 
to satisfy a settlement between parties.175  The Office relied on U.S. Bancorp 
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994), to answer the question 
of “whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil judgments 
of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after [an] appeal is filed or 
certiorari sought.”176  In that case, after the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari, the adverse parties reached a settlement, and the petitioner 
                                                                                                                   
 170 TTAB Relents, supra note 23.  
 171 Houndstooth Mafia Enters., 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1155. 
 172 Id. at 1156. 
 173 Id. at 1154. 
 174 Id. at 1156. 
 175 Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)). 
 176  U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 19 (1994). 
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subsequently asked the Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
on the grounds that the settlement “mooted the case.”177  The Court 
unanimously held that “mootness by reason of settlement d[id] not justify 
vacatur of a judgment under review.”178  Justice Scalia cited several policy 
reasons for denying vacatur based on a settlement agreement in this case: first, 
it is “inappropriate . . . to vacate mooted cases, in which [the Court] ha[s] no 
constitutional power to decide the merits, on the basis of assumptions about the 
merits”; second, although vacatur of moot decisions may increase splits among 
the federal circuits and prolong “debate,” circuit splits are important because 
they highlight the issues to be analyzed by the Supreme Court; and third, the 
“availability of vacatur” may “deter settlement[s] at earl[y] stage[s].”179 
The federal court, however, cited 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1), standing firmly on 
the grounds that it was acting as an appellate court in review of the TTAB’s 
decision, and therefore, any order by the court must be followed by the 
board.180  The court pointed out that the USPTO did not intervene “timely,” it 
did not take an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit (the “controlling court”), and 
U.S. Bancorp had no binding authority over this case.181  Judge Proctor also cited 
precedent to back up his stance that the federal court has the final say in 
conflict between it and administrative agencies.182  
Under what circumstances may an administrative agency like the TTAB 
refuse to comply with orders issued by federal courts?  According to the federal 
court in this case, the TTAB must comply because the district court is acting 
with “appellate jurisdiction” and thus its orders are “mandates” upon the 
agency.183  This argument would make sense if the district court was reviewing 
the TTAB’s decision as erroneous.  But no argument was made or presented on 
the theory that the TTAB got it wrong concerning the likelihood of confusion 
element of infringement—in fact, the district court never “received any 
evidence suggesting that the board's decision was wrong.”184  
                                                                                                                   
 177 Id. at 20. 
 178 Id. at 29.  
 179 Id. at 27–28. 
 180 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1156–57 (“The [district] court [reviewing an inter 
partes TTAB decision] may adjudge [1] that an applicant is entitled to a registration upon the 
application involved, [2] that a registration involved should be canceled, or [3] such other matter as 
the issues in the proceeding require, as the facts in the case may appear.” (emphasis added) (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1)).  
 181 Id. at 1156. 
 182 Id. at 1157 (“Administrative agencies [ ] are not free to ignore [a] court’s mandates.” (quoting 
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 200 F.3d 942, 950 (6th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in 
original); “When a lower court is subject to appellate review, it ‘is not free to deviate from the 
appellate court’s mandate.’ ” (quoting Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437, 1440 n.2 
(11th Cir. 1984)). 
 183 Id. at 1156–57. 
 184 Charles L. Gholz & Katherine D. Cappaert, The Solicitor’s Office Should Monitor District Court 
Reviews of Decisions by the PTAB and the TTAB Intervene When Appropriate, 92 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
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Thus, the court’s order for the TTAB to vacate its holding came only to 
satisfy the terms of a consent agreement between the adverse parties—which 
the TTAB rightfully argues does not bind them to vacate a decision on the 
merits.185  With a standoff between the federal courts and the TTAB now 
erupting, the Director of the USPTO, Michelle Lee, decided to intervene.186 
Fifteen U.S.C. § 1071(b)(2) allows the Director of the USPTO to intervene 
in actions of concern within its jurisdiction, although it is rare for her to do 
so.187  The standoff in Houndstooth Mafia presented an occasion important 
enough to justify intervention by the Director.  The Director should intervene 
“when what the district court either has done or has been asked to do impacts 
the institutional interests of the PTO.”188  Given the potential precedential 
effect of the TTAB’s vacatur of a non-erroneous judgment by order of a federal 
district court by means of enforcing a consent judgment, the USPTO certainly 
had an institutional interest in the outcome of this case.  Unfortunately for the 
TTAB, however, the Director’s motion to intervene was too little, too late.  
After “sitting on” this decision for a year, the court ruled that the motion to 
intervene was untimely—and was thus dismissed.189 
After the federal district court’s final opinion on the matter, the TTAB 
reluctantly vacated its judgment—but signaled that the USPTO is retaining the 
right to possibly seek further review of the matter.190  Therefore, while the case 
between the University of Alabama and the Houndstooth Mafia may be over, 
the legal issue resulting from it remains unsolved. 
B.  HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA REPRESENTS A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION IN 
THE POST-B&B HARDWARE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND THEREFORE THE 
TTAB SHOULD APPEAL 
It is important to keep the timeline of the Houndstooth Mafia case in mind.  
The Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in B&B Hardware in March of 
2015.191  The case stands for the rule of binding and final decisions of the 
TTAB on issues of trademark eligibility (such as likelihood of confusion), and 
                                                                                                                   




 185 See Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (“[T]he parties did not have the right to agree 
among themselves that the Board’s precedential decision should be vacated.”). 
 186 Id. at 1163. 
 187 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(2). 
 188 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184. 
 189 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1165. 
 190 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184 (“The Director of the USPTO specifically reserves the 
right to seek further review of the orders and opinions of the district court in this matter.” 
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Pitts, Opp. No. 91187103 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2016)). 
 191 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
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therefore federal courts are to give proper deference to its holdings on such 
issues.192  
The legal action in Houndstooth Mafia began in 2008, and in 2013, the TTAB 
issued its holding in favor of Houndstooth Mafia (that there was no likelihood 
of confusion between its mark and marks owned by the University of 
Alabama).193  The consent judgment was issued in May of 2014, ordering the 
TTAB to vacate.194  With the USPTO Director’s motion to intervene dismissed 
as untimely, the federal court finally held in February 2016 that the TTAB was 
without authority to decline compliance with the court’s order, and thus must 
vacate according to the terms of the consent judgment.195  One month later, the 
TTAB published its order vacating its judgment, but retaining the right to 
appeal.196  Given the fact that the district court published its opinion still 
demanding vacatur of a non-erroneous TTAB holding one year after the 
precedential decision of B&B Hardware was issued, giving preclusive effect to 
such judgments, the USPTO exercised its right to appeal.197 
The holding of Houndstooth Mafia represents a major step in the wrong 
direction in the post-B&B Hardware legal landscape.  This case is the first of its 
kind since the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2015, and the USPTO should rely on 
its holding in appealing the Northern District of Alabama’s holding ordering 
vacatur.  B&B Hardware gave preclusive effect to TTAB decisions, specifically 
in that case to likelihood of confusion issues in subsequent trademark 
infringement action.198  In Houndstooth Mafia, the federal court ordered the 
TTAB to vacate its decision regarding likelihood of confusion—explicitly 
disregarding any issue preclusion from the TTAB’s holding.199  
If Judge Proctor had followed the Supreme Court’s precedent set by B&B 
Hardware, he would have found the TTAB’s holding that there was no 
likelihood of confusion between the two marks at issue to be binding and 
preclusive.  Therefore, the Northern District of Alabama would have given 
deference to that finding and could not make any subsequent ruling on that 
issue, let alone order its vacatur.  Giving issue preclusion to the TTAB’s finding 
would certainly have favored the defendants in the infringement case at bar, and 
thus would reward them for putting up a diligent fight at the TTAB 
                                                                                                                   
 192 See Cathcart, supra note 114. 
 193 TTAB Relents, supra note 23. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 
1165 (N.D. Ala. 2016). 
 196 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184. 
 197 Thomas Vitt, Federal Judge vs. TTAB – Trademark Battle over Bear Bryant’s Houndstooth Hat, 
THETMCA.COM: TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT, AND ADVERTISING (Apr. 15, 2016), http:// 
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 198 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 199 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1150. 
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proceedings.  This outcome is precisely what the holding in B&B Hardware was 
designed to effectuate.  
Instead, Judge Proctor effectively ignored the Supreme Court by mandating 
the TTAB to vacate its holding on that specific element of infringement—one 
year after B&B Hardware was decided.  In all actuality, the federal court’s final 
holding in Houndstooth Mafia is directly adverse to the Supreme Court’s in B&B 
Hardware.  Therefore, to protect its newly given authority by the Supreme Court, 
and to eliminate any potential precedential effect of the Houndstooth Mafia 
decision, the USPTO appealed the order of vacatur—but only to voluntarily 
dismiss its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit shortly thereafter.200  In doing so, the 
USPTO maintained its position that the court’s order was in error.201  Based on 
the foregoing facts and precedent set in B&B Hardware, the USPTO should 
have stood by its appeal.  Now, without the opportunity for the Eleventh 
Circuit to make a determination on the legality of the court’s order, the 
relationship between the courts and the USPTO has taken a tragic step 
backwards to the pre-B&B Hardware era. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware, holding that federal 
courts must give preclusive effect to determinations made by the TTAB,202 the 
USPTO erred by dismissing its appeal of the Northern District of Alabama’s 
order to vacate their non-erroneous holding.  Its dismissal wastes a golden 
opportunity to strengthen the agency by giving precedential power to B&B 
Hardware.  
This Note begins by introducing trademark law in the context of the recent 
trend by universities of enforcing proper use of their marks through the legal 
system.  Ultimately, the Note focuses on the evolving relationship between the 
federal courts and the USPTO, specifically in light of the recent decision in 
Houndstooth Mafia.  This relationship underwent a major change after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware.  The trademark system was 
originally designed as follows: litigants before the TTAB challenged the 
registration of marks, and either simultaneously or subsequently challenged 
infringement of those marks in the federal courts.  
                                                                                                                   
 200 Ira S. Sacks & Rachel B. Rudensky, USPTO Drops 11th Circuit Appeal of ND Alabama Order in 
Houndstooth Case, MARKS, WORKS, & SECRETS: AKERMAN INSIGHTS ON THE LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (May 16, 2016), http://www.marksworksands 
ecrets.com/2016/05/uspto-drops-11th-circuit-appeal-of-nd-alabama-order-in-houndstooth-case 
/.  
 201 Id. 
 202 TTAB Relents, supra note 23 (“TTAB rulings can have preclusive effects on infringement 
suits . . . .”). 
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Before 2015, however, litigants unsatisfied with TTAB decisions could 
relitigate the same issues before the federal courts—thus manipulating the 
system by challenging holdings on the specific findings of fact.203  Even though 
the federal courts may have appellate jurisdiction204 over the TTAB holdings, 
issues of appeal are issues of law and not of findings of fact.  The B&B 
Hardware decision is aimed at making the original design of this hierarchy work 
by giving preclusive effect to findings by the TTAB.  Therefore, litigants cannot 
simply go around the TTAB and hope for better luck in the courts on the same 
issues. 
Houndstooth Mafia represents the first challenge since B&B Hardware to this 
relationship “dynamic.”205  The TTAB made a non-erroneous finding of no 
likelihood of confusion.  The federal court ordered vacatur of the TTAB’s 
holding in order to satisfy the terms of a consent agreement between the 
parties.  The TTAB, in resisting the court order, was correct—and based on 
B&B Hardware, the federal court was in error.  This finding of fact by the 
TTAB on the element of likelihood of confusion must stand, and the court 
must give deference to this finding.  It may simply not be dismissed either 
because the parties want it to be or because the court believes it has the 
authority to order it so.  
Although the USPTO initially appealed the order to vacate, it shortly 
afterward chose to “quietly” dismiss its appeal and end the years-long 
“standoff.”206  But by going through with the appeal of this order, the TTAB 
would retain its authority granted by the Supreme Court in B&B Hardware.  The 
federal court’s order in Houndstooth Mafia seems to give no deference to the 
holding of that case.  In fact, it represents a step backwards by giving absolutely 
no preclusive effect to the TTAB’s findings.  The outcome is such that federal 
courts could, at will, order vacatur of TTAB findings given the circumstances of 
the case at bar.  If the vacatur of non-erroneous TTAB determinations is on the 
table in court, and appeals to either the parties or the bench, then what real 
power do they have?  A judge may simply sign an order to eliminate its holdings 
based on the fact that it is an agency and not a court.  Unfortunately, because 
the USPTO chose not to continue with its appeal, it appears that unrestrained 
                                                                                                                   
 203 For example, in Houndstooth Mafia the TTAB held there was no likelihood of confusion—
which favored the Houndstooth Mafia.  The University also brought an infringement action in 
the federal court.  Likelihood of confusion is likewise an element of infringement. Because the 
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court on the infringement case if preclusion was given to that issue.  Therefore, it was beneficial 
for the University to settle—but on the condition that the court order the TTAB to dismiss its 
holding on the likelihood of confusion element, for precedential purposes.  Thus, the University 
found a way around the TTAB by manipulating the rules. 
 204 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). 
 205 TTAB Relents, supra note 23. 
 206  Bill Donahue, USPTO Drops 11th Circ. Appeal Of Alabama TM Ruling, LAW360 (May 2, 2016), 
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judicial authority over the administrative agency will continue unchecked—even 
given B&B Hardware.  
What do the TTAB’s holdings mean if they carry no binding authority in 
court?  An appeal by the USPTO here would give weight to the B&B Hardware 
holding and empower the agency.  Litigants will be incentivized to dedicate 
more time and resources to proceedings before the TTAB.  Importantly, it 
would set a precedent reinforcing the TTAB’s critical place in trademark law.  
Sadly, however, the USPTO chose to take a knee rather than to go into 
overtime. The USPTO was correct in maintaining its stance on the preclusive 
effect of its non-erroneous holdings, but erred in dismissing its appeal—thereby 
losing the opportunity to reinforce B&B Hardware and improve the relationship 
it has with the federal courts. 
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